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The term ADR, or Alternative Dispute Resolution, refers to 
a variety of techniques alternative to litigation, including ar­
bitration, 1 apt for the resolution of disputes. The main differ­
ence between arbitration and other alternative dispute resolu­
tion processes is that whilst the former is regulated by statute, 
that is the 1996 Arbitration Act,2 none of the latter processes 
is so fettered. ADR clauses may be drafted either in simple 
form, referring a dispute to a single process for resolution, 
or in multi-tiered form, referring the dispute to two or more 
ADR processes sequentially, generally escalating from facil­
itative towards adjudicative processes. The advantage of multi­
tiered clauses lies in the fact that the various facets of a 
complex dispute may be resolved by the most appropriate 
process at the relevant stage, even though such clauses may 
render the process more cumbersome. For the purpose of the 
current analysis, the enforcement of arbitration clauses, siin­
ple ADR clauses and multi-tiered clauses will be considered 
separately. 
Arbitration Clauses 
The relationship between the arbitral process and the courts 
has, in default of appropriate provisions regulating arbitration, 
proved to be a cause of great contention, not least because 
the courts have, in various cases,3 refused to enforce an arbi­
tration agreement. Courts often perceive such clauses as an 
attempt by the parties to oust their jurisdiction. Subsequent 
judgements however demonstrate that the courts did on oc­
casion tend to give effect to the intention of the parties en­
shrined in the agreement to arbitrate a future dispute by or­
dering a liberatio ab observantia iudicii in view of the lack 
of appropriate statutory provisions specifically regulating the 
matter. Section 15 (3) of the Arbitration Act has radically al­
tered the position subsisting prior to its promulgation by di­
vesting the courts of their discretion in this matter, and thus, 
in accordance with that particular provision, the courts are 
bound in such cases to stay proceedings in favour of arbitra­
tion. This course of action is not however directed by the 
courts ex officio in cases where the plaintiff has, in breach of 
the agreement to arbitrate, instituted litigation proceedings, 
and thus, the court shall only order a stay of proceedings so 
brought when the relevant plea has been raised in limine litis.
In fact, failure on the part of the defendant to raise the plea 
for a stay at the appropriate stage amounts to a tacit waiver on 
the part of defendant to enforce such clause at a later stage. 
Moreover, for the plea for a stay to succeed, the arbitration 
clause should comply in form with the provisions of the Ar­
bitration Act, and thus the agreement to arbitrate must nec­
essarily be in writing,4 this provision being a common pro­
vision in most statutes5 regulating arbitration, on the basis 
that by entering into such agreement the parties would be re­
nouncing their right of recourse before a court of law in re­
spect of such claim. Though the clause may include further 
particulars, including, inter alia, the number, quality and ap­
pointment of arbitrators and the applicable law or other con­
siderations on which the award is to be based, no other par­
ticular formality is required by the act, any lacunae being reg­
ulated by the default non-mandatory provisions of the Act it­
self. However, for an arbitration agreement to be enforceable, 
its terms must be clear and certain in the sense that it must 
be evident that the parties intended any future contention to be 
resolved by the decision of an arbitrator other than by the 
courts. 
A thorough reading of the Act proves that the courts do 
play a residual role, despite being limited and delayed, in re­
spect of arbitration, such residual role consisting in the super­
vision and support of the arbitral process itself. Such juris­
diction arises on the issue of the award which, in virtue of 
section 70 enjoys the status of executive title, and therefore 
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equal to a court judgement. The court also exercises a residual 
role in that a challenge of the award on any of the grounds 
listed in Section 70 of the Act is to be lodged before the 
Court of Appeal. Finally, a meticulous examination of the ar­
bitration clause is warranted in every case as the clause may 
itself limit the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, by, inter 
alia, limiting the reference only to issues of quantum, or lia­
bility, such issues of substantive jurisdiction being within the 
power of the arbitral tribunal itself, subject to challenge in 
terms of section 70 (3) (iii) of the Act. 
ADR Clauses 
ADR clauses which refer to any process apt for the resolu­
tion of disputes other than arbitration are not subject to any 
statutory formalities, and on this basis, their enforcement may 
give rise to difficulty. It should however be noted at this pre­
liminary stage that sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act 
does refer to 'mediation, conciliation or other procedures' 
which may be utilized in a bid to encourage the settlement 
of the dispute and further that if the dispute is resolved prior 
to the commencement of the arbitral proceedings or prior to 
the issue of an award, the tribunal is to issue an order for ter­
mination of the arbitral proceedings, or, if requested by both 
parties, to record the settlement in a consent award.6 Since, as 
stated above, ADR clauses are not fettered by any statutory 
formalities, the clause need not be in writing, the only ap­
plicable principles being those of general contract law, in­
cluding that the parties should have achieved consensus ad 
idem, in the sense that both should have intended to refer any 
future dispute arising between them to some ADR process. 
In other words, proof of a verbal agreement to ref er the dis­
pute to any ADR process is theoretically valid and may be 
invoked by one party against the other. The pertinent question 
however relates to the enforcement of such clauses, and thus 
whether a court will enforce an ADR clause or decline so to 
do when any of the parties to such a clause has instituted lit­
igation proceedings in breach thereof. Due to the fact that such 
issues have never surfaced before our courts, reference will 
be made to judgements of foreign courts which have sought 
to resolve this dilemma. 
It is sound to state that under English law the enforceabil­
ity of ADR clauses depends on the intrinsic nature of the clause 
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itself and the processes to which it refers. In Walford v. Miles 
& Courtney7 and Fairbairn Ltd. v. Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) 
Ltd} the English courts asserted that an agreement to nego­
tiate is not enforceable at law, and this on the basis that a court 
cannot establish with sufficient certainty what the obligations 
which it is being asked to enforce are, nor can a court mon­
itor or assess compliance thereto. However, English courts 
have demonstrated their willingness to enforce such claus­
es when compliance thereto was easily determinable, such 
being especially applicable when the process provided for is 
a process which is binding as to its result. Thus, in Jones v. 
Sherwood Computers Services pie .,9 a clause which provid­
ed that any disputes should be referred to the expert deter­
mination of a neutral, which determination was to be final, 
conclusive and binding on the parties, was enforced by the 
courts. 
A clause which refers any future dispute to a non-binding 
ADR technique may also be enforced if, other than being in 
Scott v. Avery form, that is by making the reference to such 
ADR process a condition precedent to the right of either party 
to refer the dispute to arbitration or litigation, the clause in­
cludes a time-limit within which settlement of the dispute 
must be attempted. A clause drafted in this form overrides 
the difficulties faced by the courts in Walford v. Miles, in which 
case the relevant clause provided for negotiations 'for such 
time as is reasonable' . 
Though early decisions of the Australian courts have de­
clined to enforce ADR clauses, the same courts have recent­
ly found grounds on the basis of which an ADR clause may 
be enforced. The courts, in one of the earlier decisions, that 
is Allco ( Queensland) Pty. Ltd. v. Torres Strait Gold Pty. Ltd.10
refused to enforce an ADR clause, and this on the basis that 
such clauses constituted an attempt by the parties to oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts, whilst in another case, Coal Cliff 
Collieries Pty. Ltd. v. Sijehama Pty. Ltd.,11 the courts decid­
ed, in consonance with the decision of the English Courts in 
Walford v. Miles, that an agreement to negotiate lacks the 
necessary certainty to create legally binding obligations. With 
regard to the Allco case it is noted that such clauses do not 
oust the jurisdiction of the Courts, but, as our own courts have 
held with reference to arbitration clauses,ADR clauses mere­
ly limit and delay such jurisdiction so that the right of either 
8 Fairbairn Ltd. v. Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd. [1975] 1 All ER 716
9 Jones v. Sherwood Computers Services plc. [1992] 1 WLR 227
10 Allco (Queensland) Pty. Ltd. v. Torres Strait Gold Pty. Ltd., unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, 12th March 1990
11 Coal Cliff Collieries Pty. Ltd. v. Sijehama Pty. Ltd. [1992] 28 NSWLR 194
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party to refer the dispute to litigation subsists unless the par­
ties have successfully negotiated settlement and reduced such 
terms to writing, in which case they would be contractually 
bound thereto. The same arguments relating to the issue of 
uncertainty raised above with regards to the status of ADR 
clauses under English law may be availed of to counter the 
Australian court's decision in Coal Cliff Collieries Pty. Ltd. 
v. Sijehama Pty. Ltd. The Supreme Court of New South Wales,
in Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd. v. Natcon Group Pty. Ltd.
12 
whilst ordering the stay of arbitration proceedings pending
the conclusion of conciliation proceedings, held as follows:
An Agreement to conciliate or mediate is not to be likened ... 
to an agreement to agree ... Depending upon its express terms 
and any terms to be implied, it may require of the parties par­
ticipation in the process by conduct of sufficient certainty for 
legal recognition of the agreement. 
And the same court, in AWA Limited v. Daniels and Others, 13 
whilst expressly disapproving of the decision handed down 
in Allco ( Queensland) Pty. Ltd. v. Torres Strait Gold Pty. Ltd., 
considered the commencement of litigation without compli­
ance with contractual provisions as an abuse of the process. 
The obtaining situation in Australia is applicable in the Unit­
ed States, so that the courts, in Southerland Corp. v. Keat­
ing 
14 held that
A contract providing for alternative dispute resolution should 
be enforced and one party should not be allowed to evade the 
contract and resort prematurely to the courts. 
It is evident, from the judgements of the courts themselves 
that the specific problems relating to enforcement of ADR 
clauses are reminiscent of the difficulties which emerged in 
the past in relation to contractual agreements to arbitrate, and 
thus it is envisaged, as the evolving situation within the Eng­
lish and Australian jurisdiction demonstrates, that due to the 
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developing nature of ADR, problems of enforcement should 
be gradually eradicated and the status of ADR clauses clear­
ly defined. 
Multi-Tiered Clauses 
A theoretical analysis of the enforcement of ADR clauses in­
volves an admixture of the principles and suggestions out­
lined above. Hence, a multi-tiered clause gives rise to the same 
problems above with regards to the enforcement of ADR claus­
es, even though the extent of such problems depends on the 
type of processes for the use of which such clause provides. 
In other words, a multi-tiered clause which comprises, inter 
alia, a reference to arbitration should be capable of enforce­
ment, at least in so far as it relates to arbitration, and this in 
view of section 15 (3) of the Arbitration Act providing for 
a stay of court proceedings. An essential requirement which 
must be satisfied nonetheless is that of writing, and thus, un­
less such multi-tiered clause is written into a contract or in­
corporated by reference, such clause, or part thereof, would 
not be capable of enforcement. It is noted that the UK Arbi­
tration Act expressly provides for the enforcement of such 
clauses, article 9 (2) thereof providing that an application re­
questing the court to stay proceedings brought before it may 
be made notwithstanding that the matter is to be referred to 
arbitration only after the exhaustion of other dispute resolu­
tion procedures. The introduction of a similar clause in the 
Arbitration Act would alleviate some of the difficulties which 
could arise in an attempt to enforce a multi-tiered arbitration 
clause. 
On the other hand, multi-tiered clauses which are entire­
ly devoid of a reference to arbitration, enjoy the same status 
of a simple ADR clause, to which the above analysis applies. 
12 Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd. v. Natcon Group Pty. Ltd. [1992) 28 NSWLR 194 
13 AWA Limited v. Daniels and Others, unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 24th February 1992
14 Southerland Corp. v. Keating [1984] 456 U.S. 17
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